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Andrey A. Shchurov, Radek Mařík 
 
Abstract— Nowadays, the consequences of failure and downtime of distributed systems have become more and more severe. As an 
obvious solution, these systems incorporate protection mechanisms to tolerate faults that could cause systems failures and system 
dependability must be validated to ensure that protection mechanisms have been implemented correctly and the system will provide the 
desired level of reliable service. This paper presents a systematic approach for identifying (1) characteristic sets of critical system elements 
for dependability testing (single points of failure and recovery groups) based on the concept of layered networks; and (2) the most 
important combinations of components from each recovery group based on a combinatorial technique. Based on these combinations, we 
determine a set of test templates to be performed to demonstrate system dependability. 
Index Terms— Dependebility testing, distributed systems, formal models, layered networks.  
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION                                                                     
OMPUTING systems have come a long way from a single 
processor to multiple distributed processors, from indi-
vidual-separated systems to networked-integrated sys-
tems, and from small-scale programs to sharing of large-scale 
resources. Moreover, nowadays virtualization and cloud tech-
nologies make another level of distributed system complexity. 
On the other hand, the consequences of failure and downtime 
have become more severe. They might endanger human lives 
and the environment, do serious damage to major economic 
infrastructure, endanger personal privacy, undermine the via-
bility of whole business sectors and facilitate crime [1]. As an 
obvious solution, computing systems incorporate protection 
mechanisms to tolerate faults that could cause systems failures 
and, as a consequence, the most difficult part of systems de-
ployment is the question of assurance that system dependabil-
ity mechanisms (fault tolerance or high availability) have been 
implemented correctly and a system is able to provide the de-
sired level of reliable service.  
Dependability is an integrating concept that unites the at-
tributes of reliability, availability, safety, integrity and main-
tainability. The original definition of dependability determines 
the system ability to deliver service that can justifiably be 
trusted [2] (this definition stresses the need for justification of 
trust).  The engineering definition is simpler – dependability is 
the ability of a system to avoid service failures or the probabil-
ity that a system will operate when needed. The four major 
categories of dependability are: 
• fault prevention, i.e. prevention of the occurrence or 
introduction of faults;  
• fault removal, i.e. reduction of the number and severi-
ty of faults; 
• fault forecasting, i.e. estimation of the present number 
and the likely consequences of faults 
• fault tolerance, i.e. avoidance of service failures in the 
presence of faults as the basic mechanism for achiev-
ing dependability requirements [3]. We need to state 
here the difference between fault tolerance and high 
availability: a fault tolerant environment has no ser-
vice interruption, while a highly available environ-
ment has minimal service interruption. 
The key factor of fault tolerance (or fault transparency [4] is 
preventing failures due to system architectures and it address-
es the fundamental characteristic of dependability require-
ments in two ways [5]: 
• replication, i.e. providing multiple identical instances 
of the same component and choosing the correct 
result on the basis of a quorum (voting); 
• redundancy, i.e. providing multiple identical instanc-
es of the same component and switching to one of the 
remaining instances in case of a failure (failover). 
As a consequence, a system must be validated to ensure that 
its replication/redundancy mechanism has been correctly im-
plemented and the system will provide the desired level of 
reliable service. Fault injection (the deliberate insertion of 
faults into a system to determine its response [6] [7]) offers an 
effective solution to this problem. Fault-injection experiments 
provide a means for understanding how these systems behave 
in the presence of faults (the monitoring of the effects the in-
jected faults have on the systems final results). Simulated fault 
injection (or environment fault injection) [8] [9] [10] [11] can 
support all system abstraction levels – architectural, function-
al, logical, and electrical. This mixed-mode simulation, where 
the system is hierarchically decomposed for simulation at dif-
ferent abstraction levels, is particularly useful in the case of 
complex distributed systems. 
C 
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In turn, strategies for the fault-injection experiments are 
generally based on methods for assessing system reliability 
(identifying potential faults and determining the resulting 
error effects) [12] [13] [14] [15]. Typically, it is a document-
centric evaluation, where a group of engineers evaluates the 
system. But in the case of complex or non-standard systems, 
personal experience and/or intuition are often inadequate. 
Our main goal is the automated design and generation of test-
ing procedures/specifications and plans for distributed sys-
tems based on end-user requirements and technical specifica-
tions as a necessary part of project documentation. Thus, to 
accomplish such a goal we need to identify a test strategy for 
fault-injection experiments based on a formal model with the 
following criteria: (1) it has to cover all aspects of distributed 
systems [4]; and (2) it has to be simple enough for commercial 
application. 
This paper presents a systematic approach for identifying: 
• characteristic sets of critical elements (hardware and 
software) of the distributed system under test (DSUT) 
for dependability testing (single points of failure and 
recovery groups) based on the concept of layered 
networks; 
• the most important combinations of components from 
each recovery group based on the combinatorial (or 
truth tables) technique. 
Based on these combinations, we determine the set of test 
templates which should be performed to demonstrate that 
protection mechanisms for achieving dependability require-
ments (fault tolerance or high availability) have been imple-
mented correctly. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the related work. Section 3 presents a test strategy for 
fault-injection experiments based on the formal multilayer 
model of distributed systems for checklist generation missions 
and analytical tools for system reliability assessment. Section 4 
introduces an example based on a simple multi-layered sys-
tem. Finally, conclusion remarks are given in Section 5. 
2 RELATED WORK 
Nowadays, models for assessing reliability of distributed 
systems can be roughly classified into [16]: 
• user-centric models; 
• architecture-based models; 
• state-based models. 
2.1 User-Centric Models 
Generally, user-centric models can be defined as the top-down 
or service-oriented approach (i.e. the viewpoint of the busi-
ness/end-users community) to the reliability of distributed 
systems [17] [18] [19]. As reliability of any system has direct 
impact on the system usage, so these models focus on us-
er/subscriber and provider behavior and basically work on 
the principle of evaluating transmission time to compute the 
execution time of each file or program under real conditions 
running in a distributed environment. As a consequence, the 
system reliability is based on the operational or usage profile 
of the given set of services. 
The common analytical tool for user-centric models is time-
based models (founded on the queueing theory) [19] [20]. Us-
er-centric approaches can be characterized as multi-stage 
problem solving processes where the system is conceived in 
terms of user behavior. 
2.2 Architecture-Based Models 
In contrast to the user-centric models, architecture-based 
models can be defined as the bottom-up or hardware-based 
approach (the viewpoint of the engineering community) to the 
reliability of distributed systems. In turn, they can be classified 
into: (1) component-oriented models; (2) communication-
oriented models. 
Component-oriented models represent distributed systems 
as a composition of multiple processors but completely ignore 
the failures of communications and assume that the communi-
cation channels (links) among the processors are perfect [21] 
[22] [23]. Without considering communication failures, the 
exchanged information between components (software and 
hardware) must always be correct. In this case, the problem of 
distributed system reliability can be reduced to a parallel-
series structure. In turn, the parallel-series reliability is easy to 
calculate [23] [24] [25] [26]. Such condition may be a good ap-
proximation for a system that exchanges only a little infor-
mation among nodes, such as those where the processors do 
only their own jobs (no intensive data transmission). 
The analytical tool for component-oriented models is relia-
bility block diagrams (one of the conventional and most com-
mon tools of system reliability analysis [25] [26]). 
In contrast to the component-oriented models, communica-
tion-oriented models consider the communication failures and 
assume that the components themselves (the nodes of net-
works) are always perfect [23] [26] [27]. They suppose that the 
system failures are caused by the communication failures on 
channels (links) while the components (or nodes) cannot fail 
during the executing of programs. Such condition is a good 
approximation for cases where the communication time dom-
inates the time of program execution or the components are 
highly reliable in comparison to the channels. 
The analytical tool for communication-oriented models is 
network diagrams (commonly used in representing communi-
cation networks consisting of individual links [23]). 
An additional effective analytical tool for architecture-base 
models is fault tree diagrams (the underlying graphical model 
in fault tree analysis) [23] [25] [28]. Whereas the reliability 
block diagrams and network diagrams are mission success 
oriented, the fault tree shows which combinations of the com-
ponent failures can lead to system failures. And fault tree dia-
grams can describe the fault propagation in systems. Howev-
er, repair and maintenance (two important operations in sys-
tem analysis) cannot be expressed using a fault tree formula-
tion. 
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2.3 State-Based Models 
The first generation of state-based models that considered 
both node failures and link failures have a common assump-
tion - the operational probabilities of nodes or links are con-
stant without considering bandwidth and content (constant-
reliability models) [29] [30] [31]. However, this assumption of 
the constant-reliability of elements is not suitable in practice. 
Intuitively, downloading a larger file from a remote site will 
have a higher risk of failure than downloading a smaller file 
through the same link [32]. 
The most recent models relax this assumption for the ele-
ments (nodes and links). Instead, they assume that the failures 
of elements follow Poisson processes, so that the more time an 
element works (including execution and communication), the 
less reliable that element is [32] [33] [34]. In addition, the tradi-
tional models study the network topology by physical links 
and nodes that are static without considering dynamic chang-
es of components and logic structures. To solve these prob-
lems, recent models use a virtual structure instead of physical 
structure [33] [34]. 
The analytical tool for state-based models is Markov mod-
els [23] [25]. To deal with all sorts of errors such as time-out 
failures, blocking failures, network failures, etc. (which can 
occur during operations of execution and communication), a 
hierarchical model must be used. This model suggests tackling 
various errors in different layers and uses Markov state prin-
ciple to map layers into different physical states [16]. 
 
In turn, the general approach (common to all types of mod-
els) is to treat reliability as a complex problem and to decom-
pose the distributed system into a hierarchy of related subsys-
tems or components. Rebaiaia and Ait-Kadi [35] provide a 
survey of methods, algorithms and software tools. But it is 
important to note that the reliability evaluation problem is 
NP-complete and, as a consequence, the generation of an exact 
solution is very problematic. An interesting solution called 
mission-oriented reliability is represented by Wang et al [36] 
and Luo et al [37] based on the concept of layered networks 
[38]. The core component of this solution is a two-layer model 
with the lower-layer topology (physical network) for a physi-
cal graph and the upper-layer topology (mission network) for 
a logical graph. Both graphs have the same nodes and one 
edge in the logical graph is related to a path from the source 
node to the destination node in the physical graph. In that 
way, the network missions are modeled as a network, and the 
mission-oriented network reliability can be calculated on the 
mission network which consists of many fewer nodes and 
links than the physical network does (reduction of complexi-
ty). 
Moreover, reliability of network topologies is the great 
challenge for all these models. Network communications are 
usually considered either (1) as physical communication struc-
tures based on the properties of communication hardware 
(physical links and nodes); or (2) as virtual communication 
structures (virtual information links) which normally hide the 
properties of communication hardware. In both cases, the lay-
ered structure of real communication protocols is completely 
ignored. 
3 TEST STRATEGY FOR FAULT-INJECTION 
EXPERIMENTS 
The essential idea of our approach is based on the concept of 
layered complex networks [38]. But in contrast to [36] [37], the 
core component of our solution is the formal four layered 
model for test generation missions [39]. This model is stated as 
a four-layered graph as follows: 
• The functional (or ready-for-use system) architecture 
layer defines functional components and their 
interconnections (end-user requirements 
representation). An important note – this layer can be 
used for representation of social networks. 
• The service architecture layer defines software-based 
components (services/applications) and their 
interconnections. 
• The logical architecture layer defines logical (virtual) 
components and their interconnections.  
• The physical architecture layer defines hardware 
(physical) components and their interconnections. 
• The interlayer projections define all types of 
components hierarchical (interlayer) 
relations/mapping. These relations make the layered 
model consistent and represent interlayer 
technologies (virtualization, clustering, etc.) used to 
build DSUT. 
The model formal notation Gn for each layer n can be repre-
sented as: Gn = (Vn, En, Mn−1n , Vn−1)   (1) 
And: G = ⋃ GnNn=1          (2) 
 
where G is multi-layered 3D graph, derived from the system 
specification; N is the number of DSUT layers; Vn is a finite, 
non-empty set of components on layer n; En is a finite, non-
empty set of component-to-component connections on layer n; Mn−1n  is a finite set of component-to-component projection 
from layer n to layer n-1; and Vn−1 is a finite set of components 
on layer n-1. 
Applying the requirements-coverage test strategy [40] to 
the model covers each interaction from the end-user require-
ments on system, logical and physical architectural layers and, 
as a consequence, provides the sets of test templates for each 
architectural layer: 
 Tn = {(Pn1, cn1), (Pn2, cn2), … , (Pnk, cnk)}         (3) 
 
where Pni represents the paths (or data flows) in Gn; and cni are 
technical characteristics of component-to-component commu-
nication processes. In turn, each path Pni is the set of individu-
al components which communicate each other and define this 
path (data flow): 
 Pni = {vn1, vn2, … , vnm}, vni ∈ Vn    (4) 
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This approach allows use of the advantages of (1) the concept 
of layered complex networks [38] and (2) the approach of 
mission-oriented reliability [37] but it covers all layers of OSI 
Reference Model  [41] and, as a consequence, both software-based 
and network-based aspects of distributed systems [39]. 
The next steps are based on the appropriate analytical tools for 
reliability assessment (analysis is performed independently for 
each architectural layer): 
• success (logic) tree approach (as a special case of the 
fault tree approach); 
• combinatorial (or truth tables) technique for the logic 
trees evaluation. 
3.1 Success Tree Approach 
The system performance can be considered from two opposite 
viewpoints: the various ways that a system fails or the various 
ways a system succeeds. The success tree approach [28] is a 
deductive process by means of which a desirable event, called 
the top event, is postulated, and the possible ways for this 
event to occur are systematically deduced. The success tree, 
which shows the various combinations success events that 
guarantee the occurrence of the top event, can be logically 
represented by path sets. The Boolean expression for the 
success tree can be written as [42]: 
 Sn = Pn1∗ ⋁Pn2∗ ⋁…⋁Pnk∗     (5) 
 
where Sn is the top event which denotes the state of the system 
on layer n (the entire system is in operational state iff it is in 
operational state on all layers simultaneously): 
 Sn = �1, system is in operational state (OS) 0, system is in failure state (FS)   (6) 
 
and Pni∗  represents the path sets of the logical tree on layer n. In 
turn, each path set can be written as [42]: 
 Pni∗ = vn1∗ ⋀vn2∗ ⋀…⋀vnm∗              (7) 
 
where vni∗  represents the basic events (or the state of individual 
components) in the success tree on layer n: 
 vni∗ = �1, component vni is in OS0, component vni is in FS , vni ∈ Vn   (8) 
 
In the case of complex systems that need more than one de-
sirable top event simultaneously (composed of subsystems), 
the resulting expression of the entire system can be defined as 
a conjunction of success trees of their subsystems. 
One of the main purposes of representing logical trees in 
terms of Boolean equations is that these equations can be 
reduced to its the most compact form which represents the 
minimal path sets or “minimal prevention sets” [42]. In our 
case, the most convenient representation of these compact 
forms is the conjunctive normal form (CNF) that provides a 
particular representation of the success tree as a set of sets of 
basic events. The Boolean expression of the success tree in 
conjunctive normal form for each layer n can be written as: 
 SnCNF = ⋀ �⋁ vnij∗rij=1 �li=1       (9) 
 
where l is the number of clauses in the CNF expression, and 𝑟𝑖 is 
the number of literals (or basic events) in each clause; and vnij∗  
represents the basic events: 
 vnij∗ = �1, component vnij is in OS0, component vnij is in FS , vnij ∈ Vn  (10) 
And: 
�vnij |  1 ≤ i ≤ l;  1 ≤ j ≤ ri� ⊆ {vni |  1 ≤ i ≤ m} ⊆ Vn     (11) 
 
This resulting CNF expression defines two characteristic (pre-
vention) sets for dependability testing: 
Single Points of Failure [13]. If a clause of the resulting expres-
sion in CNF is a literal, i.e. it represents a single component of 
DSUT, so this component is a single point of failure. It means 
all possible paths can be destroyed by removing this compo-
nent. As a consequence, components of that kind do not need 
additional testing but disaster recovery plans as part of project 
documentation.The set of components that are single points of 
failure for each layer n: 
 SPOFn = �vnij|1 ≤ i ≤ l; 1 ≤ j ≤ ri;; ri = 1�, vnij ∈ Vn   (12) 
 
Recovery Groups [13]. If a clause of the resulting expression in 
CNF is a disjunction of literals, i.e. it represents a group of 
component of DSUT, so this group provides topological re-
dundancy. It means all possible paths cannot be destroyed by 
removing a single component of this group – an alternative 
path (or paths) still exists.  As a consequence, components of 
that kind need additional testing of protection mechanisms 
(sensing and switching). The set of components that provide 
fault tolerance for each layer n: 
 RGn = �vnij|1 ≤ i ≤ l; 1 ≤ j ≤ ri; ri ≥ 2�, vnij ∈ Vn   (13) 
 
For the case of systems which can tolerate failures of k arbi-
trary components simultaneously: 
 l ≥ k, ri ≥ k + 1         (14) 
A special case of recovery groups is the set of access points 
or end-user components (hardware and software). As a rule, 
these components are starting points of the most paths (data 
flows). However, generally fault tolerant design (replication or 
redundancy) is normally not used for end-user components. 
This statement is based on two main reasons: 
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• economic reason – replication/redundancy tends to
increase the system cost; 
• technical reason – replication/redundancy may
increase complexity to the point where the 
replication/redundancy itself contributes to accidents 
[1]. 
As a consequence, DSUT components of that kind do not con-
tain protection mechanisms and do not need additional test-
ing. Based on this assumption, access points (end-user com-
ponents) can be eliminated from analysis by converting all 
literals which represent these components into tautologies. In 
this case, the resulting Boolean structures for each layer n can 
be represented as: 
SnCNF = ⋀ �⋁ vnij∗∗rij=1 �li=1 , vnij∗∗ = � 1, vnij ∈ Anvnij∗ , vnij ∉ An ,  An ⊂ Vn   (15)
where An is the set of access points (or end-user devices) on 
layer n. 
3.2 Logic Trees Evaluation 
When calculating the probability of multiple simultaneous 
failures, the number of combinations that should be tested can 
be reduced dramatically. So, for further analysis of the result-
ing Boolean structures in CNF we can use the combinatorial 
(or truth tables) technique [25]. This method relies on a com-
binatorial algorithm to exhaustively generate all probabilisti-
cally significant combinations of both failure and success 
events and subsequently to propagate the effect of each com-
bination on the logic tree to determine the state of the top 
event. The quantification of logic trees based on the combina-
torial method yields exact results and these are associated 
with a specific physical state of DSUT [25]. 
The sum of the probabilities of all possible combinations is 
unity because the combinations are all mutually exclusive and 
cover all event space [25]. For the case of independent 
identical units (IIU) with reliability of p, the universal set for 
DSUT can be represented as: 
∑ �mk�(1 − p)kpm−kmk=0 = 1            (16) 
where k is the number of failed components, and m is the 
number of DSUT individual components defined by the 
resulting Boolean structure in CNF – see (15): 
m = ∑ rili=1   (17) 
Theoretically testing activities should cover the universal set. 
However, in this case the number of combinations C that should 
be tested is: C = ∑ �mk�mk=0 = 2m      (18) 
For independent identical units (IIU) with reliability of p, 
the reliability expression R for DSUT can be defined based on 
the set of components that provide fault tolerance (or clauses 
of the resulting CNF expression – see (15)): 
R = ∏ �∑ �rij � (1 − p)jpri−jri−kij=0 �li=1        (19) 
where 𝑘𝑖 is the number of individual components in each 
recovery group of the 𝑟𝑖 items that must be in the operational 
state for the system to be in the operational state (k-out-of-r 
structure). 
In the worst case of 𝑘𝑖 = 1 (this case determines the 
maximum number of possible combinations), the number of 
combinations in each recovery group is: 
Ci = 2ri − 1 | ri ≥ 2        (20) 
However one combination must be excluded from analysis – 
all components of a system are in operational state – this state 
is the initial state for fault-injection testing. Thus, the number 
of combinations C that must be tested is: 
 C = �∏ (2ri − 1)li=1 � − 1          (21) 
Obviously, this result is better than the universal set coverage. 
Nevertheless for a large volume of l and/or 𝑟𝑖, the generation 
of this large number of tests is still impractical and, as a 
consequence, some additional steps (optimization) must be 
used. 
The next step of our approach is based on two basic assumptions: 
• Real distributed engineering systems are usually
under great financial and timing constraints and, as a 
consequence, they consist of the smallest possible set 
of components with a minimal number of 
communication links as a tradeoff between cost and 
reliability requirements, i.e. their topologies can be 
represented by Harary graphs [43] (connected simple 
graphs with a minimal number of edges) with the 
additional links based on technological requirements. 
• It is not necessary to cover all possible successful
combinations but the most important (the most likely) 
only [44]. In turn, the most important combination 
can be derived from end-user requirements as the 
number of failures which a system is able to tolerate 
simultaneously. 
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Nevertheless, they can be divided into small 
subsystems based on individual functional tasks 
(end-user requirements).
• Specific areas (the military, nuclear or aerospace
industries) are beyond the scope of this work.
The most typical values of the number of clauses (after elimi-
nation of end-user components) are based on architectural 
solutions: 
• The physical architecture layer. The assumption is
 
based on the hierarchical design model [46]. The
 
upper bound represents core, distribution
 
(aggregation) and access network layers with an
 
additional layer for server hardware and the lower
 
bound represents the fact that even the simplest
 
architecture consist of at least one network
 
component and at least one server: 2 ≤ l ≤ 4.  
• The logical architecture layer. It is similar to the
 
physical architecture layer but based on virtual
 
components: 2 ≤ l ≤ 4.  
• The service architecture layer. The assumption is
based on the three-tiered architecture [4]. The upper
bound represents user-interface, processing and data
levels and the lower bound represents the fact that in
the case of the simplest client-server model clients can
directly communicate with servers: 1 ≤ l ≤ 3.
In turn, the most typical values of the number of literals (indi-
vidual components) in each clause (after elimination of end-
user components) are based on technological solutions: 
• Redundancy [5]. Two identical instances of the same
component in active/standby (switching to the
remaining instances in case of a failure) or
active/active mode, i.e. 1-out-of-2 structure: ri =2,  ki = 1.
The typical reliability values (examples) of COTS equipment 
(hardware) is shown in Table 1. Unfortunately, it is impossible 
to find similar data for COTS software. Nevertheless, for sta-
ble releases of software components (services and/or plat-
forms – operating systems/firmware) the reliability function 
becomes dominated by hardware failures and the impact of 
software failures becomes smaller with respect to the total 
component failure rate [26] [47]. So, analysis of the physical 
architecture layer can be applicable to the entire system. 
1.
 
In the case of a system which can tolerate failures of a single
arbitrary component (or just have no single points of failures), 
the most important states that should be covered by tests are: 
•
 
a system is in operational state and all components are
in operational state; 
•
 
a system is in operational state and a single arbitrary
component is in failure state. 
A special case (or an exception) is if solutions are based on 
virtualization technologies: they must tolerate failures of a 
single arbitrary physical server (hardware failure) while an-
other one is in maintenance mode [48]. However it is a ques-
tion of the resources sharing/allocation, not specific protection 
mechanisms. 
The system reliability assessment RL1 (the probability of 
finding DSUT in these states) is: RL1 = pm + ∑ [ri(1 − p)pri−1]pm−ri = pm + m(1 − p)pm−1li=1  (19) 
In turn, the deviation of the system reliability assessment D 
can be defined as: D = R−RL1
R
100%                   (20) 
In the case of low-quality individual components 
(0.6 ≤ p ≤ 0.9), the result is shown in Fig. 1. In turn, Fig. 2 
shows the result of high-quality components (0.9 ≤ p < 1). 
Based on information from Table 1, the average value of the 
system reliability assessment deviation in the case of COTS 
equipment is less than 1%. 
As a consequence, the number of combinations C that 
should be tested based on the system reliability assessment is 
quite trivial compared with the universal set coverage: 
IJSER
• Replication [5]. Three identical instances of the same
component in active mode (choosing the correct result
on the basis of a quorum), i.e. 2-out-of-3 structure:ri = 3,  ki = 2.
Fig. 1. Deviation of the system reliability assessment. in the case of 
low-quality components (0.6 ≤ p ≤ 0.9). Fig. 2. Deviation of the system reliability assessment. in the case of high-quality components (0.9 ≤ p < 1). 
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C = m, m ≥ 2                    (21) 
But this trivial result covers at least 99% of specific states of 
DSUT. 
2. In the specific case of reliable systems which can tolerate
failures of up to two arbitrary components simultaneously, the 
most important states that should be covered by tests are: 
• a system in operational state and all components of a 
system are in operational state; 
• a system in operational state and a single arbitrary 
component is in failure state; 
• a system in operational state and two arbitrary 
components are in failure state. 
So, the system reliability assessment 𝑅𝐿2 can be represented as: 
RL2 = pm + m[(1 − p)pm−1] + m(m−1)2 [(1 − p)2pm−2]     (22) 
 
In this case, the number of combinations that should be tested 
C is: C = m + m(m−1)
2
= m(m+1)
2
, m ≥ 3                    (23) 
It might be difficult to say whether this result is acceptable for 
commercial application. A possible solution is using two 
simple (which can tolerate failures of a single arbitrary 
component) systems in parallel instead of a complex one. 
3.3 Fault-Injection Experiments 
Based on its nature, the dependability testing (or testing of the 
sensing and switching protection mechanisms) must include 
two main steps: 
•
 
switching mechanism verification – the switching
mechanism is able to reconfigure DSUT topology (re-
route data flows) due to the component failure.
Component Repair (𝐹𝐹𝐹). In turn, this step determines the two 
interrelated activities:
 
•
 
sensing mechanism verification – the sensing
mechanism is able to (1) detect a component resurrection,
and trigger the switching mechanism (if necessary);
•
 
switching mechanism verification – the switching
mechanism is able to restore DSUT initial topology (if
necessary).
 
As a consequence, each fault injection action/step defines two 
test templates and the set of test templates TnFIJ for fault 
injection experiments can be defined as: TnFIJ = ��FIJ�vnij�, FIJ(vnij)� | 1 ≤ i ≤ l;  1 ≤ j ≤ ri; ri ≥ 2�  (24) 
So, in the case of systems which can tolerate failures of a single 
arbitrary component, the number of test templates for fault 
injection experiments (dependability testing) |TFIJ| is: |TFIJ| = ∑ 2(|RGn|− |An|) = ∑ 2(|Vn| − |SPOFn|− |An|)Nn=1Nn=1   (25) 
The next step is based on the following assumptions: 
• The number of DSUT layers is limited by the system
model (see [39]): N = 3 – the Functional architecture
layer does not define real (software or hardware)
components.
TABLE 1 
RELIABILITY OF COTS EQUIPMENT (EXAMPLES) 
* Data sources: Cisco - [49] [50] [51]; Dell - [52]; Plextor - [53]. 
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Component Fault Injection (𝐹𝐹𝐹). This step determines two 
interrelated activities that cannot be divided:  
• sensing mechanism verification – the sensing
mechanism is able to (1) detect a component failure,
and (2) trigger the switching mechanism;
Fig. 3. A simple multi-layered system (an example). 
International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research, Volume 6, Issue 1, January-2015      1172 
ISSN 2229-5518 
IJSER © 2015 
http://www.ijser.org  
• The maximum possible number of tests templates 
(dependability testing) can be achieved if: (1) the 
number of end-users (access point) which must be 
eliminated from analysis has the minimal value: |𝐴𝑛| = 1;  1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 3; and (2) the number of single 
points of failure has the minimal value:          |𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑛| = 0;  1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 3. 
So: |TFIJ| ≤ ∑ 2(|Vn|− 1)3n=1 < ∑ 2|Vn|3n=1                 (26) 
In turn, in the specific case of systems which can tolerate fail-
ures of up to two arbitrary components simultaneously, the 
number of tests templates for fault injection experiments is: |TFIJ| ≤ ∑ 2(|Vn|− 1)23n=1 < ∑ 2|Vn|23n=1               (27) 
4 CASE STUDY 
As a practical example, we have a simple multi-layered system 
(see Fig. 3). The requirements-coverage strategy application to 
this simple example defines data flows which cover the model 
based on requirements – see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.  
The resulting Boolean structures in conjunctive normal form 
after elimination of end-user components for each layer are 
shown in Table 3. In turn, these structures define characteristic 
sets for dependability testing: 
• two sets of single points of failure:
Service layer:SPOF3 = {WEB_Server_1, DNS_Server_1} 
Logical layer: 
SPOF2 = {VLAN_1, VServer_1, VServer_2} 
• the set of components that provide fault tolerance (a
recovery group): 
Physical layer: RG1 = {Switch_1, Switch_2, Server_1, Server_2} 
 
As a result we have a set of objects which need additional (de-
pendability) testing of sensing and switching protection mecha-
nisms. 
A formal set of test templates covers all successful DSUT op-
eration status - see Table 4 NN 1 – 3, 5 – 7 and 9 – 11. The system 
reliability is 96.93723651%. 
In turn, the optimized set of test templates covers the most 
important only - see Table 4} NN 1 – 3, 5 and 9. The system reli-
ability assessment is 95.93835902%. 
So, based on these optimization steps, we can reduce the 
number of tests templates from 20 to 8 (2.5 times) with the 
Reliability Assessment Deviation 1.030%. 
4 CONCLUSION 
Deployment of distributed systems sets high requirements for 
procedures, tools and approaches for complex testing of these 
systems. And the most difficult part of systems deployment is 
the question of assurance that system dependability protection 
mechanisms (fault tolerance or high availability) have been 
implemented correctly and a system is able to provide the 
desired level of reliable service. 
This paper presents a systematic approach for identifying 
critical elements based on the concept of layered networks [38]. 
The key component is the formal four layered model for test 
TABLE 2.1 
APPLICATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS-COVERAGE STRATEGY. 
BASIC SUBSYSTEM (END-USER REQUIREMENT):
[SERVICE_SUBSCRIBER_X, SERVICE_PROVIDER_X] 
 
TABLE 2.2 
APPLICATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS-COVERAGE STRATEGY. 
ADDITIONAL SUBSYSTEM (TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT DERIVED FROM 
END-USER REQUIREMENT): [WEB_CLIENT_X, DNS_SERVER_X] 
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generation missions [39]. This model is the four-layered 3D 
graph, derived from the system technical specifications, which 
covers all layers of OSI Reference Model [41]. 
Applying the requirements-coverage test strategy [40] to the 
model covers each interaction from the end-user requirements 
on system, logical and physical architectural layers and, as a 
consequence, provides the sets of paths (or data flows) for each 
layer (each path is the set of individual components which 
communicate each other and define this path). 
The next steps are based on the analytical tools for reliability 
assessment (analysis is performed independently for each 
architectural layer): 
• Success (logic) tree approach (as a special case of the 
fault tree diagrams) allows us to represent the sets of 
paths (or data flows) as a Boolean structure in 
conjunctive normal form (CNF) and, as a 
consequence, defines two characteristic sets for 
dependability testing: (1) sets of single points of 
failure; (2) sets of components that provide fault 
tolerance (recovery groups). 
• In turn, combinatorial (or truth tables) technique for 
the logic trees evaluation defines the most important 
combinations of components from each recovery 
group that must be tested. 
Based on these combinations, we determine the set of test 
templates which should be performed to demonstrate that 
protection mechanisms for achieving dependability require-
ments (fault tolerance or high availability) have been imple-
mented correctly. 
This approach allows use of the advantages of (1) the con-
cept of layered complex networks and (2) the approach of mis-
sion-oriented reliability – reduction of complexity - but it co-
vers all layers of OSI Reference Model and, as a consequence, 
both software-based and network-based aspects of distributed 
systems. 
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